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The Case





narity and pluridisciplinarity' are hallmarks of current
academics, as is the idea that every possible viewpoint
should be employed to review each problem, historical and
current. Scholars all over the academy lament the fact that
their topic is overdone, over-theorized, overworked and re-
defined ad nauseam by scores of graduate students. Friends
say to me over lunch: do we really need to ask if Shake-
speare was a transvestite? How many times do we have to
hear the word "imbricated"? Barring the discovery of a
trunk full of unknown letters in the attic, the one thing that
rarely happens these days, they say to me, is that someone
finds a real hole, a gap, a large area of study that sits right
in front of us but has never been looked at. This essay is
about the possibility of there being just such a hole.
Consider for a moment, the substantial discipline of
Religious Legal Studies. Within the sub-field of Christian
legal studies, for example, work proceeds at every academic
level as well as in seminaries on issues of canonical law, on
Christian foundations to Anglo American jurisprudence, on
the influence of the Reformation on the legal systems of
Europe, on morality in the law, on St. Augustine's City of
God and its influence on Christian legal thought. Similarly,
there are many centers of Islamic legal thought in Islamic
and non-Islamic countries. With the U.S. currently strug-
gling to democratize the governments of both Afghanistan
t Professor, University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New York.
1. Interdisciplinarity can be defined simply as integrating concepts and
processes from different disciplines while multidisciplinarity and pluridis-
ciplinarity might be defined as having several researchers from different fields
examine the same topic.
679
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
and Iraq, it has become very important to U.S. foreign pol-
icy to understand the effects of Islamic beliefs on the
secular legal systems in these countries.
Judaic law has had many historic commentators and
compilers and current areas of interest concern Jewish
law's influences on American law, legal meanings in the
Torah, the relationship between Judaic law and early
Christian law, decision-making in orthodox Jewish commu-
nities, and the role of the Torah in modern Israel. Moving to
a fourth world religion, Hinduism, the Dharmashastras and
the Laws of Manu constitute the backbone of historical
Indian responses to law. There are hundreds of books in
both Asian and non-Asian languages on the role of Hindu-
ism in India and its effects on the Indian legal system. With
the rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party ("BJP"), the pro-
Hinduism political party in the South Asian continent, the
influence of Hinduism on the current operation of secular
law in the Asian subcontinent has moved to the foreground
once again. Each of these religious legal traditions has a
long-established tradition of instruction, language training,
classical texts and literature, chaired professors, annual
conferences, Masters and Ph.D. programs as well as rab-
binical and divinity training programs both here and over-
seas.
But Buddhist law has no such legacy. There are no
established classic texts in this subject matter, no substan-
tial literature, no body of students in M.A. or Ph.D.
departments, no conferences, no chairs, no traditional
pedagogy and no academic training programs in either
religious studies departments or law schools. There are no
professors of Buddhist law here in North America and
although I continue to hope, I have yet to find them in Asia
or Southeast Asia. Other than a book I wrote on the Tibetan
Legal System,2 some long articles on Burmese legal history
by Andrew Huxley of the School of Oriental and Asian
Studies ("SOAS") in London and David Engel's current
work on injury narratives among Thai Buddhists, this is an
immense research area that has no scholarship.
The conundrum is that Buddhism is not a marginal
religious practice with little historical influence. It is one of
the largest religions in the world with a presence for over
2,500 years and over 500 million followers in India, China,
2. See REBECCA FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE (1995).
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Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thai-
land, Burma, Tibet, Mongolia and Sri Lanka. Even the
elementary student of religious studies learns very quickly
that Buddhism is a major world religion; Peter Harvey
states on page one of his introduction to Buddhism that"over half of the present world population live in areas
where Buddhism is or has been a dominant cultural force. 3
But Buddhism, which is now also being taught in small and
large centers throughout the world, has very few studies of
its influence on the hundreds of legal systems where it has
and does flourish.
Why then do we have this large disciplinary gap? Is it
due to purposeful religious prejudice? Are some people
actually blocking the development of the discipline? Is it
due to the difficulty of the languages involved: Sanskrit,
Pali, Sinhalese, Burmese, Chinese, Cambodian, Tibetan?
Did the very nature of disciplinarity, the process of amal-
gamating and forming disciplines for the study of certain
subjects in academics, preclude the study of Buddhist legal
systems? How, in the midst of the many inter-, multi-,
intra- and pluri- disciplinary study programs that now exist
did we miss the study of Buddhist legal systems over the
last 2,500 years?
This essay will track my own personal intellectual his-
tory in confronting this question, a history that is perhaps
too long in the making. The first section of this article will
be a narrative presentation of the results of my doctoral
research work in legal anthropology. I will describe the
Tibetan Buddhist legal system pre-1960 and the reactions
of American legal academics to it. The second section pres-
ents briefly the Critical Theory and Cultural Studies
concept of disciplinarity. I use it as a tool to investigate why
Buddhist legal systems have not been welcomed into Com-
parative law, Legal anthropology, Law and Society Studies,
Asian studies, Tibetan studies or even Buddhist studies.
Finally, I will take a look at Tibetan Buddhist law from the
inside out by examining some of the characteristics that we
use to describe current Buddhism-the strong priest/patron
divide, adaptability, the MahayanalTheravadan distinction,
the impact of areal studies on the formation of academic
disciplines, the influence of post-modern theory and the
situation of Buddhist studies-to explain why the study of
3. PETER HARVEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHISM 1 (1990).
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secular legal systems in Buddhist societies has only just
begun.
I. THE NATURE OF THE TIBETAN LEGAL SYSTEM
In January of 1996, I was on a plane, like many of my
colleagues, headed for the San Antonio, Texas, meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS"). A few
law professors interested in anthropology had banded
together and applied for a new special division of AALS
called Law and Anthropology. The conference was at the
enormous San Antonio Palacio del Rio Hilton on the River-
walk, one of those massive buildings that suffers from
ubiquitous architecture syndrome in which most of these
conferences seem to take place. I remember that the bro-
chures in our packet of materials assured us that we were
in Texas, and that our spouses could go out on trips to shop
at Neiman Marcus, go to see a real Texan ranch or pur-
chase "real cowgirl" Tony Lama boots in a store only a
hundred miles out of town.
On the appointed day, the four of us entered the room
where the panel was to take place and took our seats a good
twenty minutes early. Surprisingly, the room was already
full and people were struggling to find a spot to sit or stand.
No doubt the crowd was not there to listen to Larry Rosen,
Jean Zorn or I presenting papers but to catch a glimpse of
the commentator, Clifford Geertz, a world famous figure in
anthropology.
A. A Talk about the Tibetan Legal System
I arose to give my twenty-minute presentation and pro-
ceeded to outline the basics of the pre-Chinese Tibetan legal
system from approximately 1940 to 1959 that I had
researched as my dissertation fieldwork. I began by point-
ing out that their government bureaucracy was headed by a
charismatic religious leader, the Dalai Lama and had equal
numbers of two types of administrative officials-lay offi-
cials trained in secular schools who were drawn from the
noble and clerical classes, and monk officials, trained in
monasteries from a young age to serve in the government.
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Paired officials, one religious and one lay, manned each
judicial level in every part of the system except for one. The
administration had two judicial wings, the lay offices and
courts for the secular population manned by paired officials
and the ecclesiastical offices and courts for legal affairs
concerning monasteries and nunneries throughout the huge
country which was the one part of the government where
only monk officials presided over legal cases and docu-
ments.
B. How did a Tibetan court work?
There were four different kinds of legal procedures
available to the parties as well as several other extra-legal
procedures: rolling dice for the answer, taking an oath in
front of a god and consulting an oracle. The parties and the
decision-maker had to agree on the choice of forum to
proceed with a case that resulted in jurisdictional patterns
that were flexible and based on consensus. Mandatory
jurisdiction for any case but murder was not strong. There
was also very little finality or closure. At any point in the
proceedings before either the Highest Ecclesiastical Office
or the local magistrate, a party could declare that he did not
feel comfortable and request to move the case venue to, for
example, a famous hermit living in a cave that both parties
respected. If the other two agreed, the venue was changed.
Similarly, the final decision document reflected this
consensus requirement; it was a document written by the
court clerks and issued by the judge at a final ceremony
4. There are five major sources for Tibetan legal concepts: (1) religious
sources material such as the Vinaya which is a canonical text outlining the
rules for the monks to follow as Buddha spoke them case by case; (2) Extant
official documents which include administrative law books, edicts, decision
documents, treatises, government contracts, estate record books, tax records
and deeds to land; (3) documents issued by non-governmental institutions such
as monastic constitutions, private leases and private contract documents; (4)
law codes; and (5) written and oral statements describing the legal system. As
far as we know, there were no books on court procedure, compendiums of cases,
extensive commentaries on the law codes, lists of additional statutes, books of
regional variation of administrative rules or casebooks. I have opined that this
is a consequence of the fact that each case was unique and Tibetans, as a result,
did not want to know as much as we do, for example, what had happened to
other people. See Rebecca French, Tibetan Legal Literature: The Law Codes of
the dGa' ldan Pho brang, in ESSAYS IN TIBETAN LITERATURE: STUDIES IN GENRE
(Josd Cabezon & Roger Jackson eds., 1996).
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during which it was signed and stamped by each party and
each party's guarantor. This demonstrated their agreement
to the decision and bound them. A large liquidated damages
clause was put in every document ("if this decision is not
followed by the parties or these parties return to court, then
the moving party shall have to pay fifty gold srang to the
standing party"). There was no case finality, no point at
which the case formally closed because any contestant had
the right to bring the same suit up against the same person
in the same or a different forum until their mind was calm.
What kept them from doing this indefinitely was the nega-
tive social view of litigating, the cost or the fact that "their
mind had become calmed." Thus, Tibetans kept the process
open and reopenable because they valued the mental feeling
of resolution; they used to tell me that a poorly wrought
decision which angers one side must always be capable of
being reopened or the anger that is generated by it will af-
fect other parts of community or nation, it will come out
again, perhaps in a more violent way.
When the local police or official was called in on a
problem and the contesting sides described what happened,
several consultations in the houses of important people to
which the parties were related was the next order of
business. Tibetans believed that equality meant equal in
wealth and social power; they opined that a contest between
two individuals who were unequal in wealth or social power
was unfair. The person with less had to work up the social
ladder through contacts until she or he had found an
individual of equal social standing to the other party to pro-
ceed. They thought that our system was based on a mythi-
cal idea, and was ridiculous in its assessment that all
people are equal before the law. It should also be noted that
a much wider net of persons was responsible for the results
of both criminal and civil cases (although this is not a
distinction that they used). All the persons along the path
of a transaction or incident were presumed to have respon-
sibility for the outcome and to appear in court. A landlord
or landowner on whose property the murder was committed
was responsible, for example.
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C. Judicial Decision-making and Foundational Legal
Concepts
What was the role of the judge and what type of deci-
sions did he make? Buddhist concepts permeated the legal
process: karma could dictate that bad actions in a past life
were the reason that a person had committed a crime in
'this life and the results of this crime would undoubtedly
result in bad karmic seeds for the next life. Judges took on
the karmic consequences of the punishments that they
ordered. Tibetan jurisprudence located the decision-making
process not in the courtroom but in the head of the partici-
pants which emphasized the importance of the mind. There-
fore, there was no closure unless there was mental agree-
ment and, as I have said above, the same case could be
opened in the same court the day after if one's mind
remained angry.
Precedent was not generally applied in the Tibetan
legal system because the law codec outlined a set of factors
for consideration and each case was viewed as entirely
unique. This eliminated several concepts we view as essen-
tial such as res judicata and stare decisis and even the idea
of rule-making, that is, evolving new rules for universal
application from a single case. If each person and each case
is unique, this is impossible. Judges as well as parties were
expected to be governed by rang khrims or "inner morality"
which meant self-regulation and self-control through the
ethical concepts in Buddhism. Thus, "acting for one's own
benefit" or "acting without the ability to discriminate,"
these Tibetan expressions were both references to negative
motivations in the law codes of the Dalai Lamas and they
mattered in a legal suit. The Buddha himself, as recounted
through countless mythological and historical stories, rep-
resented the standard not of "reasonable" conduct but of
right moral conduct.
The most universally applied terms for evaluating
aspects of the legal cases were the words, truth and honesty
and they were used to express a wide range of English
terms such as probity, justice, due process and fairness.
Truth was reached when the parties agreed and had factual
consonance and not when the facts comported with the
reality of the circumstances. After the decision document
was signed, all of the parties were expected to sit down for a
"gathering together" ceremony in which they drank beer
68520041
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together and exchanged scarves to demonstrate their calm
minds.
So, that encapsulates my very short presentation. Larry
Rosen followed with discussion of law in Morocco, then Jean
Zorn with a case from the highlands of New Guinea and
finally, Clifford Geertz elegantly summed it all up. And this
is when it all got very interesting. Almost every question
afterwards was for me and they were pitched in a surpris-
ingly high tone reminiscent of the encounter with the"romantic other." In the dry world of legal academics, this
tone was new. Here is a sample of one of the questions:
"The Tibetans seem to have come up with a system that
solves the ills that we have in terms of inequality. I love the
idea of equals in the social system only dealing with equals.
How do you think we could use that system here?"
A second professor said: "The system you describe
sounds impossible with no processes for closure and finality
and yet so much of it is true; it is obvious to all of us that
angry clients lead to more law suits. I work in Labor Law
and those decisions actually do stay open even though we
pretend that they don't. This is very exciting stuff."
II. LEGAL RESPONSES TO MY EXPLANATION OF THE TIBETAN
LEGAL SYSTEM
I lost sight of Geertz whom I had wanted to speak with
because I was surrounded by a horde of professors as I left
the room, all asking questions, wondering where they could
find more information and asking me for coffee. In anthro-
pology, we would probably describe this behavior as akin to
a religious conversion response. I have come to label this
group of lawyers the Legal Romanticists, that is, legal
actors who see other systems of law as miraculous, exotic
cure-alls providing answers for one of the perceived prob-
lems in Western law. The room had been full of them and I
have met many others in my presentations. Though a
wonderful lot and very kind, they do not take the subject
seriously. The Legal Activists, a second type, appear at
Amnesty International meetings on Tibet and other more
political forums where I have spoken. They take the mate-
rial very seriously as a call to come to the aid of the Tibetan
people being exploited by the Chinese. Many of these people
are doing very important work in getting Tibetans out of
prison and petitioning the Chinese government. Here, the
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plight of the Tibetan is a call-to-arms for the Legal Activist.
The Legal Romanticists are quite close to the Legal
Tourists, legal actors who think that it is a lot of whimsical
good fun and do not take any of the material seriously-this
is legal-lecture-on-Tibet as the equivalent of a humorous
show on the Discovery Channel.
By far the largest group I lecture to, almost 80% of the
respondents I have tabulated over 10 years, are the Legal
Imperialists who spend most of their time differentiating
other systems of law as inferior to, and less legitimate than,
the U.S. legal system. For these Imperialists, the American
system is the center of the current global system, the demo-
cratic exemplar and template. Legal Imperialists never
have to take any other legal system seriously. Anthropolo-
gists would call this simple blind legal ethnocentrism.
Because the Legal Imperialist is the majority response,
I have divided up their moves into seven subtypes to leech
out which responses are the most recognizable. First is the:
" Territoriality move ("The Tibetans don't even have
a country any more do they?"); then there is the
" Technology/evolutionary move ("They don't have
any modern industry there, right and didn't
know how to use a wheel?");
" Size move ("How many people lived in this place
anyway?");
" Anti-religious /fundamentalist move ("Well, this
was an established religious state, a cult so they
all had to follow him, even in law.");
* Barbarian move ("Didn't I read that those people
cut off hands and legs?");
" Pragmatic move ("We couldn't apply any of that
here, because none of it would work, but your
talk was very interesting anyway, thank you.");
and finally, the
" Argument to non-law ("Without any real rules, this
sounds a lot like just alternative dispute
resolution to me rather than an actual legal
system.").
Of these seven, the argument to non-law was by far the
most common, constituting approximately 56% of the Legal
Imperialist responses.
What all of this coding reveals however is the strong
reluctance of the legal academic communities to address the
law for what it is, a full-blown Buddhist legal system. The
68720041
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reception by an audience, a dismissal from serious consid-
eration rather than an acceptance at face value, is the
problem. In my view, the nature of the Tibetan data creates
hundreds of interesting legal questions to ponder. So, ini-
tially at least, the responses of legal academics were not
very thoughtful.
III. DIscIPLINARITY
I would like to turn at this juncture to the field of disci-
plinarity studies. Michel Foucault has argued that knowl-
edge is governed by power relations such that "what is
allowed (knowledge) and what is not allowed (the'unthought') are generated in relation to systems of author-
ity, rules, hierarchy and discipline, the last term including
the interesting combination of a body of knowledge and
practice and the results of training, suppression and
repression."5 These ideas have become embedded in the
fields of Critical Theory and Cultural Studies and were ini-
tially employed in the disciplines of education, rhetoric, and
English literature. Disciplinarity studies can be defined
most simply as the detailed study of the origins, history,
contents and institutionalization of academic disciplines,
the ways in which knowledge becomes power and certain
cultural materials are foregrounded or backgrounded to
constitute "discipline-ness."6 Most advocates do not cite as
fondly to their Foucaldian origins as they do to Raymond
Williams's Culture and Society or Nelson, Treichler and
5. CRITICAL THEORY SINCE 1965 137 (Hazard Adams & Leroy Searle eds.,
1990).
6. KNOWLEDGES: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDIES IN DISCIPLINARITY 2(Ellen Messer-Dardow et. al. eds., 1993). Anthropologists have tried to enter
Cultural Studies arena but have done so rather unsuccessfully on the whole andhave kept "a certain palpable distance." This is no doubt due to the fact that
they find the subject matter of Cultural Studies always local and bourgeois.
They opine that Cultural Studies presents itself falsely as "non-disciplinarity,
anti-disciplinarity or multi-disciplinarity" although it is based rather
transparently on "an ideological commitment to oppositional politics and somelegacy of Marxism" as well as Foucault that is, coincidentally, not unlike many
of the anthropologically trained professors in the U.S. today. Virginia R.Dominguez, Disciplining Anthropology, in DISCIPLINARITY AND DISSENT IN




Grossberg's Cultural Studies7 which states in the introduc-
tion "that disciplines stake out their territories and
theoretical paradigms, mark their difference... by claim-
ing a particular domain of objects, by developing a unique
set of methodological practices and by carrying forward a
founding tradition and lexicon." While several other key
theorists in this movement could be named such as Stewart
Hall, Antonio Gramsci, Edward Said, and Erie Hobsbaum,
what is more important is the current social practices that
employ this theoretical stance particularly literature,
aesthetic and textual media studies, education, composition
studies, film studies and communications. The fieldsites of
Cultural Studies scholars tend to be popular culture arenas
such as MTV, Disney theme parks, rock concerts, the Book-
of-the-Month Club, soap operas, advertisements and graffiti
but in the area of disciplinarity studies, the fieldsites are
necessarily disciplines like accounting, biology, nature
studies, the social sciences, economics, art history, law and
medicine and of course, religious legal studies.
A. Application of "Disciplinarity" to other Academic
Departments
I took this theory, that academic disciplines and sub-
disciplines were purposefully engaging in knowledge/power
strategies to eliminate material that contested their
boundaries (such as the Tibetan Legal System), and began
to ask if it applied to other arenas in which I had been giv-
ing presentations. The areas I would like to discuss briefly
are (1) some legal sub-disciplines: Comparative Law, Legal
History, Law and Religion, and Law and Society; (2)
Anthropology and Legal Anthropology, the latter a sub-
discipline in which I founded the journal so my ties should
be very strong; and (3) Asian Studies, Tibetan Studies, and
Buddhist Studies. I have given several talks or published in
each of these areas, which will serve to constitute my initial
database for disciplinarity appraisal.
7. Resulting from a conference of the same name in April of 1990. See
CULTURAL STUDIES (Lawrence Grossberg et. al. eds., 1992.
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B. Comparative Law, Legal History. Law and Religion, Law
and Society
Of the subdisciplines in law, Comparative Law is
certainly the one which I thought initially was most prom-
ising-I had been trained in it, and my collection
techniques, I thought, allowed for comparisons of the
Tibetan material to the European and other Asian systems.
On the whole, Comparative Law turned out to be ill-suited
because legal comparativists are perpetually tied up in
arguments about how to compare and about where a legal
system fits according to some typology of legal systems such
as Zweigert and Kotz.' The interesting comparative work
going on is in substantive legal fields like criminal or labor
law. Annelise Riles has written an article about the catego-
rizing, typology conundrum in comparative law in which
she designates me as the primary example of a "contextu-
alist," a person who thinks that the context of the
environment in which she works is pre-eminent. She goes
on to discuss why contextualists are marginalized or mar-
ginalizing with respect to comparative law.' As a side note,
Legal History meetings are very fun and the people are
wonderful but everyone there is really only interested in
American law. China has a little bit of purchase but that's
about it.
Next, I thought about Law and Religion, a fairly small
subdiscipline in Law and one that is primarily active
through the Journal of Religion and Law out of Hamline
Law School. In the United States, the Free Exercise, Free
Speech and Establishment clauses of the Constitution,
along with the theories of secularization and privatization,
have put blinders on the legal academy's attempts to look
seriously at religion. Within the current discourse frame-
work, the correct view of religion by a law professor is
unequivocally non-religious, that is, one should not define
oneself within legal discourse or legal practice or in front of
law students as a religious practitioner. Exceptions are
made in the very small field of moral discourse and prac-
tices through faith. Anxiety about this self-editing has
8. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(Tony Weir trans., 1998).
9. Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of
Information, 40 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 221 (1999).
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become a form of lamentation by the writers in the field
such as Michael McConnell, Michael Perry, Kent Gre-
enawalt, Stephen Smith, and others. ° But, do we find lots
of law review articles on other countries' legal systems? Or
articles even on the plentiful new religions in this country?
Hardly (although this is changing some). As a result, as I
have argued elsewhere, "Legal scholars in America have a
hard time comprehending the richness of an integrated re-
ligious perspective such as that of Tibet ....
Well, what about Law and Society-isn't that an aca-
demic forum where an anthropologist feels comfortable?
The Law and Society Association has its own mixture of
disciplinary conformity. For one thing, it has been moving
away from an interest in close anthropological observation
and interviewing as a way of gathering appropriate data
since its inception. At her installation as President of Law
and Society in 1998, Susan Silbey presented some statistics
on trends in publication in the Law and Society Review."
While she did not code by subject, her presentation did
show a dramatic decrease in the methodologies of interview
and observation in articles in the Review. Anthropologists,
who often work overseas and specialize in these face-to-face
techniques, constituted only 7.1% of the authors since the
journal's inception. The use of interviews and observation
as techniques in articles in the Review, whether by anthro-
pologists or not, had dramatically decreased over the years
from the 1960s when 68% of the authors used observation
and 59% used interviewing techniques to the 1990s when
10. Everyone is willing to take the originalist, foundationalist move to argue
about the religious affiliation of the Founders of the Constitution. The
rationales presented these days for the language in the First Amendment are,
first, Roger Williams's desire to protect the church against the corruption of the
government, or second, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson's attempts to
protect politics from the infighting and influence of the church. See MARK HOWE,
THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965). A third strategy is to argue that
these early politicians were working within an integrated Puritan-Protestant
religious ideology that was "essentially uncontested at the time." See Charles
Taylor, Religion in a Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE
(James Davidson Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
11. See Rebecca French, A Conversation with Tibetans? Reconsidering the
Relationship between Religious Belief and Secular Legal Discourse, 26 LAW AND
SOC. INQUIRY 95 (2001); see also Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The
Change in Evolving Religious Practice and its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF.
L. REV. 127 (2003).
12. Susan Sibley, Inaugural Presidential Address at Law and Society (1998).
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11% used observation and less than 35% used interviews.
Indeed, the term "interviews" here has changed over time;
they are no longer face-to-face interrogations over an exten-
sive period of time but large standardized telephone
questionnaires, so the statistic itself is perhaps problem-
atic.
13
Although Law and Society is where I spend most of my
time, primarily because I like the people and the conversa-
tions, Tibet remains simply a quirky oddity in that forum. Iremember first being introduce to Larry Friedman in the
early 1990s and he responded very politely as he shook my
hand, "Oh yes, you are the Tibet lady, hmmmm, yes I have
heard of your work." As to panels and discussions of religion
at Law and Society, I think that I have been on almost
every religion panel since 1991. There is rarely more than
one a year. As religion is very marginal in criminology
departments, in justice studies, in the larger sociolegal pro-
grams at Berkeley, Wisconsin, UC Irvine and NYU, it just
doesn't currently fit well into the Law and Society Associa-
tion. Perhaps a final reason is that this multidisciplinary
group has been flipping through several theoretical frame-
works in the last twenty years (ideology, hegemony, social
construction, hybridity, non-essentialism, governmentality,
illegality, legal consciousness and identity) a process that
dampens the possibility of presenting new, only partially
theorized, data.
C. Anthropology, Legal Anthropology
Anthropology is my home discipline besides law. I know
professors, other students, students of *students, friends
from four years in the field, publishers, conference acquain-
tances and numerous others. I have made lots of
presentations over the years since 1988 when I first
returned from the field. The problem that I have in
anthropology seems to be two-fold: first, a shift in the sub-
ject matters to those influenced by Cultural Studies that
occurred when I was in the field, and second, a very strong
13. And the journals in this area often actively reject material on religious
legal systems. I have had entire commissioned symposia on religious law for
major journals in the field rejected by reviewers of Law & Society as not
relevant and then dropped. I have seen commissioned reviews of my own and




theoretical shift that impedes the presentation and analysis
of primary data without a specific current theoretical
framework. By the time I got back from the field, anthro-
pology had begun to shift its locus to migrating immigrant
networks, refugee diasporas, foreign adoption, domestic
violence, abused women, prostitution, the spread of AIDS,
multi-million dollar corporations, Global Network Theory,
Global Media events, and Human Rights Activism. Most of
the panels at AAA meetings had shifted to Pierre
Bourdieu's praxis analyses or to the localism of globalism in
Sumbawa rather than the legal systems in Sumbawa,
Indonesia. Anthropology had finally become very current
and very theoretical which is a commendable, relevant and
frankly very exciting turn but not one that fits the study of
religious legal systems particularly well.
The only people really interested were legal anthropolo-
gists which is understandable but none of them were
working on larger nation-state systems as I was. Anthro-
pologists, especially legal anthropologists,
4 are now investi-
gating very different sorts of spaces, places, times, identi-
ties, movements and entities than they ever have before
and incorporating new theoretical perspectives. As a conse-
quence, while Tibet and Tibetans are increasingly objects
for anthropological study, the descriptive study of their
religious national legal system is not central to the current
discipline of anthropology or even particularly relevant to
the sub-discipline of legal anthropology. Luckily people
admired my work, especially because I had stayed there a
long time. In one review, Don Brennis called the Golden
Yoke a "locus classicus," which is both an incredible com-
pliment and an antiquated term.
14. See Dominguez, supra note 6, at 53, presenting the topics as gender,
hierarchies, differentiation, "race, racism or racialism; ethnic identity, ethnicity,
ethnic conflict or interethnic relations, minorities (including Afro-American
history, Latino Studies, marginality and multiculturalism); and nation,
nationalism, transnationalism and the national." She goes on to outline the
theoretical stances as: "colonialism"; "postcoloniality"; "resistance"; "hegemony";
"the discourse of subalternity"; "rebellion"; "inequality" or "power relations";
"bodies"; "sexuality"; "cultural politics"; "the invention of tradition"; "identity";
"the past"; and "imagined communities."
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D. Asian Studies, Tibetan Studies, and Buddhist Studies
The three last areas in which I tried to present my work
were Asian Studies, Tibetan Studies and Buddhist Studies.
The background of Asian Studies in the United States has
been described in several articles and I think that the sali-
ent points of this critique are beyond dispute. Area Studies
were instituted at the behest of the Federal government
after World War II and overseen from a distance by the
CIA. Most of the scholarships and federal funding for the
study of languages in the United States still comes from
Department of Defense grants. The Federal government
has been very successful in promoting the areal studies
programs to focus on specific characteristics of particular
countries deemed crucial to national defense. In this
approach, countries are promoted as unique, languages are
studied separately, and politically important areas matter.
Religion is not an essential part of this schema and neither
are interstitial and less powerful areas such as Tibet.
In both Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, my work is of
great interest but there are few people to talk to. I have
always been put on panels with people who are working on
the philology of specific words, or the ancient traditions of
prior kings, or lately, on panels in which I am expected to
discuss the most current legal developments by the Chinese
on the Tibetan plateau. I have helped to start a field of
study in Tibetan Law but I only realized later that I got the
last information that was available to be collected from
living subjects by interviewing in the 1980s the only living
former esteemed judges and officials. In summation, the
study of Buddhist legal systems with Tibet as a subset was
not to be found in any of the disciplinary homes that I
investigated.
Where does this leave us? Interestingly, one could argue
that many of these academic disciplines and sub-disciplines
are purposefully engaging in knowledge strategies that
eliminate consideration of Buddhist legal systems. This is
true in comparative law, certainly, but it is an area that has
so many critics presenting different solutions to the "prob-
lem" of comparative law that it seems like flogging a tired
animal. Law and Society certainly should be paying atten-
tion to religion and is not. And how does one excuse legal
anthropology? But is it really the case that these scholars
are actively repressing or are they just scrambling to fit in
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and taking their exclusionary clues from elders? Scholars
are solipsistic enough not to be interested in much of
anything except what they have been taught to do. Having
spent several years working on the inside of organizations
like the Association of Political and Legal Anthropologists
and Law and Society, it was hard to identify the "suppres-
sors," including myself, and easy to point to one stumbling
decision after another.
IV. WHY DON'T WE HAVE BUDDHIST LEGAL STUDIES? SOME
THOUGHTS FROM THE INSIDE
In 1994, Frank Reynolds, an esteemed professor of
religion and South Asian Studies at the University of
Chicago Divinity School, called me up and asked me to a
Numata conference on Buddhist Legal Systems. There were
four speakers: David Engel of SUNY Buffalo Law School,
Oskar von Hinuber of Freiburg University in Germany,
Andrew Huxley of SOAS at the University of London, and
myself. A panel of experts from our geographic specialty
backed each of us as we spoke. I had never been more
excited and thoroughly over-prepared to give a paper. While
I enjoyed the conference and the dinner at the Robie House
immensely, there is no evidence that the resulting publica-
tion, a great series of papers in the Journal of the
International Association of Buddhist Studies, 5 was ever
understood very well by its larger audience. During the four
days, Von Hinuber strongly denied that there was anything
like Buddhist secular law other than the words of the
Buddha for instructing the monks. Others thought the con-
ference was interesting but tended to deny "pan-Buddhist
law" as a possibility.
A. Visiting an Old Professor
It was, however, a chance meeting with an old professor
in 2000-01, that started me thinking in a completely differ-
ent way. I was asked to write an article on Religion in the
next Millenium for the Yale Journal of Law and the
Humanities in the year 2000 and to deliver it as an address
at the school. There in the audience were some of my old




professors, which made me very nervous and I gulped sev-
eral times as I spoke. Afterwards, they came up to me, very
proud and announced that we were all going to dinner at
the house of my anthropology mentor, Leopold Pospisil. The
food was wonderful and I had an opportunity to ask a few
questions of several people who knew a great deal more
than I did about Buddhism, Law and Anthropology.
One of these was Stanley Weinstein, a brilliant,
charming person and absolute bear of a professor. His stu-
dents had to learn classical Chinese and Japanese as well
as modern Chinese and Japanese before they could sit in
his enormous basement library of original texts, while
translating early Buddhist texts line by line under his
tutelage. I was always glad that I was in Tibetan but could
still take all of his classes on Buddhism. Anyway, he asked
me how my work was going and then I asked him about
Buddhist legal systems. He paused and thought for a while,
holding up his right index finger to his mouth, "You know,
Rebecca, I can't think of anything written on Buddhist
Legal Systems. Maybe you should look in The Encyclopedia
of Religion. I know there isn't anything in my library.
Hmmmm." I pressed him further by pointing out that there
were studies of Judaism and Hinduism and Christianity
and their relation to law. He replied, "There is nothing that
I know that has been written on Buddhism and Law,
Rebecca. Who is situated to do such a thing anyway? Why
don't you?"
I lay awake that night in my bed upstairs in Pospisil's
house unable to sleep. Here, I had been searching desper-
ately for probably ten years for a disciplinary home,
collecting sad stories of how the Tibetan legal system really
didn't fit anywhere, wondering about the repressive and"othering" tactics of this and that discipline when in fact
the discipline to which it would be central, namely,
Buddhist Legal Studies, didn't even exist. The Chicago
conference had not brought together the experts, it had
demonstrated that it really didn't exist yet as either a
concrete intellectual possibility or as a subject matter. If
Stanley Weinstein didn't know about it, it was no one's
fault. There had to be a few good internal, non-repressive
reasons. I felt excited.
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B. Thinking from the Inside
The reasons that I have now collected for this large
Buddhist-Legal-Studies-Hole, even in these interdiscipli-
nary, multicultural, cross-boundary times, are as follows:
First, the priest-patron divide. Several scholars believe
that when the Buddha set down rules for the monastic
sangha, known as the Vinaya, he precluded the lay
Buddhists and therefore secular legal systems. Von
Hinuber's claim was that the Buddha made no require-
ments for anyone but the monks and therefore, there were
no secular legal systems affected by the Buddhist religion.
Indeed the story of the Buddha is of a man who gives up his
political life as a prince and future king to practice
wandering as a holy teacher. It is true that there is a divide
between the monks and the supporting laypersons, but Von
Hinuber's claim is false. Many nation-states had secular
legal systems that are and were profoundly affected by the
foundational principles of Buddhism just as Tibet was. Most
Buddhist scholars have been hoodwinked by this false
interpretive line, the legal rule for the monks and the non-
legal nature of lay Buddhism.
Second, adaptability and compliancy. As Buddhism
moved across the Asian and now the Western landscape, it
was consistently open-textured and adaptive. It commonly
blended with the local traditions like animism and Shinto.
Thus in some states such as China, as Brian McKnight
claims, the influence of Buddhism on the law was minimal
because the older Confucian traditions were maintained.
16
We should not be blinded however by the characteristics of
adaptability and compliancy into thinking that those
aspects of the religion meant no influence as well. Two
other related issues are the concern in East Asia over non-
indigenous influences in their history and the strong anti-
religion orientation of Communist regimes.
Third, Buddhism is not a mutually exclusive religion,
that is, it does not require adherence, it does not demand
the creation of a polity or a legal system that comports with
its views, it does not exclude other religions and it does not
require absolute faith. These are traits of the Western
16. Conversation with Brian McKnight, Professor Emeritus, East Asian




Abrahamic religions, the mutually exclusive Jewish,
Islamic and Christian religions ("You will be saved only if
you believe in Jesus.") However the religions of the Indian
sub-continent such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism
find mutual exclusivity wholly foreign. Scholars who come
from these Western countries tend to see Buddhism as not
a religion because it lacks the characteristic of mutual
exclusivity.
Fourth, Buddhists and Buddhist Studies scholars have
adopted the argument that Buddhist cultures are entirely
different depending on their Mahayana or Theravadan ori-
entation. Their reasoning is that if the different strands of
the religion are so different as to make comparison impossi-
ble, legal comparisons are equally unfeasible. This is a trap
however. How different from the widely varying interpreta-
tions of the Gospels are the Mahayana and Theravadan
traditions both based on scriptures that were recorded right
after the Buddha's fifty years of teaching? Are these two
religious strands really more different than Christian
orthodox Turks on the one hand and American Southern
Evangelicals who speak in tongues and carry poisonous
snakes on the other?
Fifth, Areal studies has had a strong divisive impact on
the study of Buddhism by further entrenching national dif-
ferences. Knowledge gathered by country means that there
will be conferences on Chinese Buddhism or Japanese
Buddhism but not both, that the differences between the
two will be understood as great and that their relationship
will be chronological (first China, then Japan). It is here
that the reinforcing messages of disciplinarity are the most
persuasive.
Sixth, the last fifteen years have been heavily influ-
enced by postmodern theory which emphasizes differences
and the extreme ends of the spectrum as it ignores the
middle. Books focus on the local and odd or the global and
overwhelming. This scholarly tendency does not favor the
general larger questions, the religious questions, the moral
and ethical questions. Under this rubric, Buddhist legal
culture is a universalizing gesture that is wrong because it
is essentialist, trying to create a non-existent, modern nar-
rative of unity ("pan-Buddhist" legal system) when there is
none.
Seventh, and perhaps most important, Buddhism is a
very new religion in the West. Few of its texts have been
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translated and knowledge of its many sects and practices is
very obscure to many Americans. The number of texts that
have been translated into any Western languages remains
at 5 or 10%, and understandably, almost all of these have
been religious and not legal.
So, in conclusion, I would say that I have shifted away
from the disciplinarity perspective, not because it is invalid
but because it is too simple a framework. Buddhist Legal
Studies is not a lost subject matter, it is rather a sort of
hole, a hole that can arise even in this world of pluri/multi/
intra/interdisciplinary studies. Several intersecting forces,
not the least of which is too few people trained in it or even
thinking about it, resulted in the gap. Rather than a subject
matter that was being "othered" and repressed or impeded
by stronger disciplines, it is now my impression that it is a
subject matter that simply needs to be built, coordinated,
and nurtured. Classic texts need to be established, confer-
ences held, edited series of volumes initiated. Perhaps, a
critical pedagogy needs to be developed, a literature created
to then critique and examine, M.A. and Ph.D. academic
training programs in both religious studies departments
and law schools developed by chaired professors. After
fifteen years of looking for a place to fit and complaining
that no one would take me in, I have realized that I need to
set up my own tent. Indeed, Weinstein's challenge has
become an inspiration.
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